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Towards an Islamic Macro Model of Distribution: 
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A Comparative Approach 
MABID ALI AL-JARBI 
Department of&search and Statistics 
Arab Monetary Fund, Abo Dhabi, UA F. 
This paper' presents some ideas on the construction of a macro- distribution model 
of an Islamic economy. It introduces a model based on the concept that in the Islamic 
(in contrast to Muslim) society, most Muslims are propertied, though to different 
degrees, because of the application of mkBh. This implies two important propositions. 
Firs~ the study of distribution is inseparable from that of redistribution. Second, the 
distinction in saving behavior between "capitalists" and "laborers" becomes immaterial. 
The results of the model indicate no predominance of the behavior of any particular 
class to the determination of either fuctor shares, or profit rate. 
The results of the model also indicate that an Islamic economy would have higher 
growth, higher return on capital and more equitable distribution of wealth than a 
western economy of the Kaldor-Pasinetti type. 
I. Western Approaches to Distribution 
The Western thought on capital, growth and distribution is divided between 
traditionalists and non-traditionalists. The traditional approach encompasses the 
classical, the Marxist and the Austrian theories, while the non-traditional includes 
neoclassics and the post- Keynesians. 
• An earlier version of the paper was presented to the Second International Conference on Islamic Economics 
(Islamabad, Maroh 1983). The author benefited from Ausaf Ahmad's paper (1982), the comments of Sayod 
Taber of the Islamic University, Islamabad. and of other conference participants. I am also grateful for the 
comments of Ibrahim Ibrahim, the editorial assistance of Mrs. Fatema Bashi er, and the typing efforts of Mrs. 
Elham Ghosheh, all at the Arab Monetary Fund Two anonymous referees also contnbuted substantial 
comments which assisted in correcting some errors. The author is grateful for their assistance. 
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A The Traditional Approach 
The following review of the traditional approach will be limited to the Austrian and 
the Marxist theories, since it would be rather difficult to provide a compact description 
of classical theory of capital. 
1. Factors Atrecting Distribution 
The traditionalists apply a choice-theoretic structure to the allocation ofresources. 
Yet, distribution is detennined by extra- economic variables. The society is assumed to 
be divided into socio economic classes, namely, workers, capitalists and sometimes 
landlords. The social behavior embeded in the structure of each class detennines the 
long-run distribution of output. 
The size of the working class is assumed to depend upon the real wage. Workers' 
social behavior is such that they do not save. Instead, when their real wage rises above 
subsistence, their natural rate of growth increases, until the real wage rate is brought 
back through competition to subsistence. 
The capitalist class does all the saving. They provide capital for the industry. Their 
social behavior is such that larger profits imply greater saving. Landowners receive rent 
on their property which is determined by the differentials between the degrees of 
fertility of different plots. 
2. The Concept of Capital 
The traditionalists viewed production as a result of using labor only, or labor and 
land. Capital was considered neither fixed nor durable, but rather circulating and 
continuously reproduced. It is composed of "stored-up subsistence" owned by capitalists 
which would permit advances to laborers, landowners and capitalists" (Stigler, 1968: 
275). 
3. The Marxist Approach 
The original Marxist approach contains ambiguity and uneven rigor. However, the 
main propositions of Marx have been recently restated in a less ambiguous and more 
rigorous fushion (von Neumann, 1945-1946, Morishima, 1971; and Brown, Sato and 
Zarembka, 1976: 240-269). Marx stressed the extra-economic variables influencing 
distribution in a capitalist econornyC'l. He intertwined the classical concepts of socio 
economic classes with Hegelian dialectics to produce a distribution theory based on 
dialectical materialism. 
Marx offered twn important postulates: the inverse association between profits and 
wages; and between capital growth and means of subsistence (consumption per worker). 
Yet, he was only vaguely aware of how the twn propositions are related (Marx, 1968: 
94 and 218). 
1. Marx's writings show no awareness of economic systems outside the western historical experience, which he 
confused with human experience as a whole, regarding nonwestern systems as either primitive or barbaric. 
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Marx's arguments related to those propositions implied two assumptions. First, 
defining the maximum attainable real m1ge rate as the rate which would prevail if all 
profit disappeared from every industry, and the rate of exploitation as the difference 
between the maximum attainable and the actually paid wage: he assumes that the rate of 
exploitation is determined sociologically through class struggle. This is tantamount to 
assuming constant (actual) real wage rate. 
Second, he assumed workers savings to be zero, equating consumption per worker 
to the real wage rate. AB a result of the consumption-investment relationship implicit in 
his postulate on capital growth and means of subsistence, the rate of growth which 
corresponds to the prevailing wage rate must equal the rate of profit, provided that 
capitalists do not consume. Both the rate of growth and the rate of profit are positive if 
and only if the rate of exploitation is positive. 
An important aspect of the Marxist model, of which Marx himself was not aware, is 
the implicit assumption of indecomposabilityofthe system. 
Marx's first postulate of a negative relationship between profits and wages can be 
translated into a relationship between the uniform equilibrium rate of profit and the real 
wage rate, that is a factor-price or a wage-profit frontierCZ>. The inverse relationship 
between capital growth and consumption can be interpreted as a relationship between 
the rate of growth and the level of consumption, or the consumption-investment frontier. 
Morishirna (1971) has established the dual relationship between both frontiers<3). He 
also showed that Marx conclusions require that both frontiers are unique and identical 
with each other. This holds true only for indecomposable economies. Decomposable 
economies, in contrast, have many consumption-investment frontiers, each of which is 
associated with a corresponding wage-profit frontier. This more general case has many 
equilibrium rates of profits and rates of growth, where the highest equilibrium rate of 
growth on any consumption-investment frontier is equal to the highest rate of profit on 
the corresponding wage profit frontier. Obviously, Marx model is only a very special 
case. 
A general equilibrium condition for the classical model is that the rate of balanced 
growth g, which is a function of the real wage rate w. and the (natural) rate of growth of 
the labor force, n, must be equal, or 
g(w) ~n (1) 
Since the assumption of constant n could render (1) insolvable, n has been made 
positively dependent on w, so that n would be negative when w ~ 0, n ~ 0 when w is at 
subsistence, and n > 0 when w is above subsistence, which makes 
g(w)~n(w) (2) 
2. This frontier could have, under certain conditions. what is called reswitching. 
3. This is an extension ofBruno (1969) and consistent with Kemeny et al (1956). see Brown, Sato and Zarembka 
(1976). 
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With this specification, Morishima (Brown, Sato and Zarembka, 1976) has shown 
that both g and n are positive if and only if the subsistence real wage is lower than the 
wage rate. In other words, under the very special case of the Marxist indecomposable 
economies, exploitation is necessary for the capitalist economy to have a balanced 
growth. 
It is noteworthy that the model is built in real terms, where money plays no specific 
role. There is no reason for the holding of money by individuals to be rational. It is, 
therefore, a barter growth model which in some mysterious fashion, manages to conduct 
all transactions at no cost and with no medium of exchange. The rate of interest in real 
or monetary sense plays no role. 
4. The Austrian Approach 
The Austrian approach is another trend which evolved in reaction to Marxist 
thought(•>. The role of capital (as known to the classics) is, according to this school, to 
permit the use of roundabout methods of production (Stigler, 1968: 201-19). Those 
methods are claimed to be more productive than direct or non-capitalistic methods. 
Capital intensity can thus be increased by increasing the degree of roundaboutness 
(Hicks, 1973: 6-8; Hayek, 1941: 41-49). The (average) period of production measures 
the length ofroundaboutness. 
As restated byWicksell (1901; Stigler, 1968), ifreal output is y, real wage rate is w, 
period of production is t and rate of interest is r, then the annual product per worker pis 
equal to }', and 
t 
In order to maximize the wage rate, we must have 
dp = wr 
dt 2 






Equation (5) implies that capital is rewarded according to its marginal productivity, 
while wages are ostensibly a residual. It must also be noted, as Wicksell himself pninted 
out, that in the Austrian model, the direction of change in the labor and capital shares, as 
more capital is applied (the production period is lengthened), cannot be determined a 
priori. 
4. The main figures in this school are Bohm-Bawerk (1921), wick:sell (1901), and walras (1926). Two authors 
have been most influential in providing a modern restatement of the Austrian theory namely, Hayek (1941) 
and Hicks (1973). 
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The above model reflects not only the Austrian view of distribution, but also their 
theory of interest. The Austrians (Bohm-Bawerk, 1889 and Wicksell, 1901) discussed 
the three grounds fur the existence of a rate of interest. They criticized the first ground, 
namely, individual differences in want and provision in the future relative to the present, 
as tending to cancel out in a stationary economy. They have accepted the second ground 
of myopia. The third ground of the technical superiority of present over future goods 
has been used, especially by Wicksell as a direct productivity explanation of interest. 
The Austrian school has been criticized (Bliss, 1975: 6) for failing to capture the 
essential features of reality, with respect to the capital concept ofroundaboutness, and 
the sole reco~tion of the case of a single rate of interest. The latter claim to a unique 
interest rate< , which reappears in the neo-Austrian furmulation, particularly Hicks 
(1973), requires the assumptions of no uncertainty and no externalities (Burmeister, 
1974: 419-20). 
The Austrian theory treats capital as wealth, or command over current output (Bliss, 
1975: 6), as it considers capital to be the physical goods used in production. Viewing 
capital as wealth can be connected to viewing the rate of interest as the price of capital. 
Yet, the rate of interest is not the price of capital<6J. 
If the rate of interest were the price of capital, it should be lower along a capital-rich 
relative to a capital-poor growth path. However, it has been shown (Bliss, 1975: 81-83; 
111) that the rental of capital vector, which is the price of the use of capital, and the 
analogue of the wage rate, is that which is expected to be lower, and not the rate of 
interest<'). The central role of the interest rate in the Austrian theory is insidious. 
Modern capital theoreticians call, either explicity or implicity through their own 
analysis, for the substitution of an intertemporal price system for the rate of interest as 
the central concept of the theory<''· 
B. The Neoclassical Approach 
1. The Cambridge Model 
The Cambridge approach has arisen within the neoclassical framework which 
endeavors to explain income distribution through the processes of rational choice. 
Despite controversies netted within geographic confusion between American and 
British Cambridge, the Cambridge model has become a representative of the 
neoclassical analysis par excellence. It is therefore advisable to review in brief the 
salient features of that model(9). 
5. Called by Hicks a "Fundamental Tbemem," (Ricks 1973:19). 
6. In the words of Bliss (1975: 6), ''The value which accrues from a sale is the product of price and quantity sold 
Hence if the rate of interest is the price of capital, the quantity of capital must be the wealth on which an 
interest yield is calculated". Also, see Burmeister (1 974: 421). 
7. The price of the use of capital goods would be determined as the price of a composite capital good in terms of 
a numeraire consumption good. 
8. This is not to deny the pedagogical role of the Austrian theory referred to by Burmeister (1974: 499). 
9. The Keynesian revolution has taken its toll from Cambridge, that we can find within the school the (neo-) 
neoclassicals such as Paul Samuelson, and Robert Solow from the USA and James Meade of England, as well 
as the neo-Keynesians such as Joan Robinson, Nicholas Kaid.or andLonigi Pasinetti from England (Harcourt, 
1972:1). 
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The Cambridge model is based on the assumptions upon which the semi-stationary 
state has been founded. Every input used in production grows at the rate of growth of 
the economy, g, and one of those inputs, which is labor, is not produced, and is fully 
employed. Labor has a subsistence level of consumption, so that the rate of growth of 
labor, g, does not depend on the real wage rate. This implies that the rate of interest is 
not too high to allow each worker to reach subsistence. 
A critical assumption of this school is what is named the classical savings 
assumption, (Hahn & Matthews, 1964: 793-94), which involves few implications. All 
wage income is spent on consumption, which makes profits the only source of saving, 
and the proportion of profits saved is constant. All investment is financed out of profit, 
and a constant fraction of profits is being invested. The saving-profit and the 
investment-profit ratios would thus be equal to b where O< b<l. 
Production activities within the Cambridge model are defined through a linear 
homogeneous production function exhibiting constant returns to scale. This would be 
the fumous Cobb-Douglas formula. Accordingly, fuctor earnings correspond to their 
marginal products. 
The assumptions of the theory leads to conclusions in the fields of distribution as 
well as growth. Factor shares in the total product will be equal to the elasticity of that 
output with respect to each factor evaluated at the point concerned. 
The rate of growth of the economy, g, will be equal to the saving- profit ratio b 
multiplied by the rate of interest r (Bliss, 1975: 119-29)0°l. 
g (r) ~ lJrClll (6) 
The neoclassical approach, as appears from its conclusions, claims the pricing of 
the factors of production to be the main mover in the process of income distribution. 
Obviously, the key element in that pricing process is the substitutability of the factors of 
production. 
The one-commodity (output) model used by the neoclassical theory and which 
underlies the Cambridge model has been a soorce of some controversies named after 
Cambridge. The reason is that paradigms derived from the one-commodity model "do 
not always carry over to multicommodity intertemporal general equilibrium models" 
(Brown, Sato & Zarembka, 1976, xvi). Some of the properties of the one- commodity 
model which do not generally hold, as presented by Samuelson (Brown, Sato & 
Zarembka, 3-23), are: the equality of the rate of interest and the marginal product of 
capital; monotonic increases in per capita consumption, the capital/labor ratio, and the 
output/capital ratio as the rate of interest falls; no reswitching; and the equality of the 
elasticity of the fuctor-price frontier and the factor-share ratio. 
10. In this model, the rate of return on capital, the rate of profit and the rate of interest are all equal. 
11. The rate of growth is written as a function ofr, the rate of profit. 
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2. The Post-Keynesian Critique 
The most obvious aspect of the neoclassical approach, and perhaps the source of 
strongest attacks, is its insistence upon the sole importance of technical substitution 
between factors and commodities. The approach, thus, ignores the institutional and 
sociological factors influencing distribution. Joan Robinson, a strong critic of this 
approach accuses it of suggestiog harmony, if not justice among the different groups in 
the capitalist system; something that could be interpreted as a support for the status quo. 
Neither the contributions made along the lioe of aggregate production functions and 
the vintage models, in relation to the concept of capital and the explanation of 
productivity changes overtime, nor the attempts to update the Fisherian analysis were 
able to settle the debate. On the contrary, further criticism was hurled against 
marginalism in relation to double switching and capital reversing. 
Finally, macro-theories of distribution have come out in response to the desire to 
return to the classical tradition where "pricing is an aspect of distribution rather than, as 
in neoclassical thought, distribution being but an aspect of pricing." Harcourt (1972: 9). 
Kaldor (1955-56) and Pasinetti (1962) are some of those who contributed in this regard. 
C. A Return to the Classics 
I. Post- Keynesianism 
If the post-Keyoesian trend in reshaping capital, growth and distribution theories 
were to be traced to a particular writer, Kalecki (1933) would be the one02). The issue, 
as might be expected was the classical saving assumption which was paradoxically one 
of the building blocks of the neoclassical (Cambridge) version. The assumption 
amplifies the classical perception of savings: that savings from profits (S ,P) dominate 
savings from wages (SwW), the total saving is equal to 
s = SwW+ s,w; o~ Sw~S.~ 1 (7) 
Equation (6) without the right-most condition can be considered as the general 
saving fimction (Hacche, 1979: 55-62). It becomes the classical saving function when 
0 = Sw < S, Kalecki (1933) has shown that given such condition, investment determioes 
profits and not vi.ce- versa. 
Another aspect of the neoclassical approach is factor substitutability, which was 
assumed to assure equilibrium and stable growth, and which requires capital 
malleability and a smooth productioo function. Kaldor (1961: 202) pointed out to the 
limited and costly possibilities of substitution. 
A third aspect of the neoclassical approach is using K for aggregate capital in the 
production function which implies an assumption of homogeneity: As Robinson (1954) 
pointed out, meaningful definitions of the aggregate capital, the productioo function, 
and marginal products require knowledge of relative values of goods, ~ the price 
vector and the rate of profits. Obviously, it is the latter that the neoclassical theory 
attempts to explain. 
12. See Joan Robinson (1977: 15), and Hacche (1979: 175). 
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Ail for the questions of saving propensities and capital malleability, it has been 
shown (Hacche, 1979: 176-78) that as long as Sw and Sp are sufficiently different and the 
profit-income ratio is variable (between zero and uoity), the saving function shown in 
(6) can be incorporated in the neoclassical model to produce stable equilibrium growth. 
2. Kalecki 
Kalecki (1933 & 1954; and Hacche, 1979:186-192) ignoring the public sector and 
fucusing attention on manufuctoring industry, assumes the marginal cost to be constant 
within the normal (below full capacity) range of ootput. Regarding salaries as 
overheads, he proposes that the manual labor share in income (wages) is determined by 
the degree of monopoly prevalent in the market. 
Kalecki's theory has been termed a tautology for he defines his explanatory 
variable, the degree of monopoly, as the price/prime cost ratio, which is closely related 
to the reciprocal of the share of wages, and which is the variable he intends to explain. 
However, Kaldor defends Kalecki's proposition that income distribution is determined 
by market structore, i.e., the strength and weakness of the forces of competition, as 
neither empty nor invalid, althoogh it may be difficult to test. 
3. Kaldor 
In dealing with a fully-employed economy, Kaldor (1961) postulates a saving 
function of the form (7). He identifies the profit share with the profit margin of the 
Marshallian representative firm. He also assumes that excess demand (excess supply) of 
goods causes the profit margin to rise (full) at full employment, i.e., profit margins are 
flexible. Using 
Y-W+P 00 
and equating investment I, which is assumed to be exogeneous, with saving, he 
obtains the profit share as equal to 
P (ItY)-8,., 
y- s,-sw (9) 
where I and Y are full employment investment and income. Moreover, in order 
that PN remains between zero and uoity, (9) implies that 
(10) 
It is obvious that condition (10) requires the propensity to save oot of profits to be 
higher than that oot of wages. 
Kaldor's theory implies that, given full-employment ootput, the propensities to save 
and invest determine the distribution of income. However, this conclusion is subject to 
some external constraints. 
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Firs~ the asswned exogeneity of investment implies that it is independent from 
both the saving function and profits. Independence from the former has a Keynesian 
flavor, but from the latter is hard to justify. Kaldor tries to overcome this by introducing 
an investment function in which investment directly varies with profits. However, a rise 
in profit margins (because of excess demand) may lead to a larger increase in 
investment than in saving. This has been claimed (Hahn and Matthews, 1964:34) to be a 
source of instability. 
Second, given the capital/output ratio v, the rate of profit PIK should not fall below 
the rate of interest r plus the internal rate of return on (the marginal product of) capital i, 
that is 
p p 1 . 
-=-·-~1+r 
K Y V 
(11) 
This condition implies that (i + r) represents the minimwn financial conditions 
which would be necessary to entice producers to invest. 
Third, defining the degree of monopoly (Kalecki, 1933, and 1954) U as the 
proportional margin of price P over average cost a (the sum of unit wage cost and unit 
raw materials cost), or 





The Jburth external condition is that the profit share must not exceed the level 
which allows the labor force to receive the minimwn socially acceptable wage rate w' 
that is: 
p Y-W' 
-<---y- y (14) 
If the asswnption of full employment is dropped, with the existence of 
underemployment; equilibriwn output, profits, and wages are determined solely by the 
degree of monopoly. 
4. Pasinetti 
Pasinetti (1962) goes back to the classical distinction between capitalist and labor 
classes, assigning to each within the Kaldorian model a different propensity to save. 
By defining the propensities to save by capitalists and laborers as S, and SL 
respectively he rewrites (7) as 
S ~Sc {W +PL)+ S, P, ; 0 S Sc SS, S 1 (15) 
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While (5) implies that Kaldor (1966: 298) attaches the higher propensity to save to 
profits rather than to capitalists, Pasinetti attaches it to capitalists rather than to profits 
(Hacche,1979:221). The Kaldorian full-employment distribution of income, as modified 
by Pasinetti then implies a capitalists share of income equal to: 
Pc _ (ifY)-SL 
y Sc-~ 
Which would fall between zero and unity provided that 
(16) 
(17) 
In distinguishing between capitalists' and laborers' wealth, Pasinetti assumes that 
both grow at the same natural rate n. In equilibrium, the rates of profit going to 
capitalists and laborers must be the same. Pasinetti's growth model would then have one 
feasible solution, that is when capitalists' wealth is positive<">. 
(18) 
According to this solution, the saving propensity of the propertied non-working 
class is the only strategic variable determining the long-run share as well as rate of 
profits in the Pasinetti model. This conclusion still bolds, no matter bow many other 
social classes are introduced into the model. Even if a neoclassical production function 
were introduced, it would have no effect on the long-run profit rates. This has been 
dubbed the Pasinetti Paradoi1•> (Hacche, 1979:223). 
5.Ahmad 
Ahmad (1982) introduces mkah into a Kaldor-Pasinetti model. ,Zakah is presumably 
collected on :zakatable assets A, some of which may not be productive capital. This 
distinction gives rise to some conceptual problems. The s<>-called non-productive assets 
are held either for their stream of services, as in conswners' durables, or for the expected 
appreciation in their prices, or both. Since inflation is ruled out in K.aldor's non-monetary 
model, only consumers' durables will be beld as "non-productive" assets. There would be 
no rational reason, apart from monetary uses, to hold barren assets, like bullion. 
Defining :zakatable assets owned by capitalist as A,,, their capital assets as K.,, their 
profit earnings as Pc. and their savings as S" we can derive the steady-state equilibrium 
which corresponds to (18). By using Ahmad's results (Ahmad 1982:13) we obtain(") 
13. The details of these derivations are found in Hacche (1979), especially Ch. 12. The reader can refer to the 
same place for the solution when capitalists' wealth is uro. 
14. For a helpful synthesis of the issues revolving around this paradox see Meade (1966). 
15. See appendix I for tire derivation. 
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(19) 
where o is mkBh rate as defined in Ahmad (1982). Remembering that profit rates 
going to capitalists and workers are equal in equilibrium, then 
~(1-o(~:)J=~ (20) 
Where P is total profit and K is total capital resources. 
The above result shows that, similar to Pasinetti's model, the profit rate depends on 
the saving propeosity of the capitalist class. However, It also depeods on mkah rate<">. 
A requirement for a feasible solution would be 
(21) 
This means that for growth to be positive the rate of profit on capitalist total 
(productive aod non-productive) assets must exceed the rate of mkah. 
In addition, the income shares as derived by Ahmad (1982) depend upon the saving 
propensities of both capital owners and wage earners, as well as zakah rate. 
The above conclusions of Ahmad, although made within the Kaldor-Pasinetti 
traditions, show a positive breakaway of his model from its precorsors in that respect 
Yet, the results shown by (20) that the profit rate depeods upon the saving propeosity of 
the capitalist class implies that the breakaway is incomplete. 
The reason for the K.aldor-Pasinetti remaining influence on Ahmad's model is his 
division of income between capital owners and wage earners. This is what will be shown 
below to be in contradiction with some of the characteristics of an Islamic economy. Once 
this is corrected, the breakaway from post-Keynesian influences will be greater. 
II. Towards an Islamic Approach 
A Islamic Versus Contemporary Muslim Structures 
We have seeo from the preceding short survey of Western literatore that the factors 
behind distribution are two kinds: Socioeconomic mainly class struggle stressed by the 
classics, and purely economic mainly market furces stressed by the neoclassics. In order 
to evaluate which set of variables to use as a basis of constructing an Islamic theory of 
distribution, a distinction must be made betweeo the Muslim economies as they exist at 
present, and ao Islamic economy which truly adheres to the teachings of Islam. 
16. This is a step further towards showing that distribution and redistribution are inseparable. 
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1. Muslim Economies 
The advent of colonialism to the Islamic world has been accompanied by two 
phenomena. The first was the mass destruction and deformation of the existing Islamic 
socioeconomic institutions. The second is the mass transplantation of Western 
institutions into Dar Al-Islam Successive changes have brought the Western-adopted 
ways ofnationalism, capitalism and socialism to the formerly Islamic adherents. 
Such influx of socioeconomic change has Westernized the way of life in some 
countries into a conversion to Western values. In some other countries the 
transformation was incomplete. 
It is not therefore surprising to find elements of the Western civilization lurking in 
Muslim countries, and sufficiently tempting economists to use Western theories as a 
basis for analysis. Much has been done in the area of looking at the Muslim economies 
through market oriented processes, not much different from the neoclassical eye. Much 
also has been done to analyze contemporary Muslim activities and modern history 
through Marxist eyes. 
It would be naive on the side of Islamic thinkers to claim that their contemporary 
socioeconomic structures cannot be analyzed using a capitalist or a Marxist laboratory 
manual. Such structures bear a great deal of resemblance in their formal build-up to 
both of the centers of Western civilization. The process of Hellenizing the East which 
fuiled in pre-Islamic timesC17J have finally succeeded in our times, not through Athens or 
Rome, but rather through London, Paris, Washington, and Moscow. 
It is not, therefore unexpected to see Western models being readily applied on 
Muslim communities by different scholars with some measure of success. This is 
because the formal process in those societies in the socioeconomic and political fields 
have taken Western form; sometimes capitalist, sometimes Marxist. 
2. The Islamic Model 
While the Muslim world has been, through either foreign or domestic hands, 
forcibly transformed into Western forms, the majority of Muslims themselves have not 
been converted to Western ideals. They still yearn to the total and uncompromised 
application oflslarn. 
It is therefore natural that Islamic thinkers would try to build an Islamic model 
through which they can accomplish a multitude of goals. First, it is useful to envision a 
set of Islamic institutions which can ultimately replace the current hodgepodge of 
imported institutional concoctions. Second, economic analysis within an Islamic 
environment is almost impossible without such a model. Third, policy implications 
cannot be claimed without reference to a specific formal structure. 
The difficulty connected with constructing that model, apart from the intellectual 
effort involved, is the fact that current socioeconomic structures in the Muslim world 
1 7. with the exception of the Helleoi7.ation of Christianity which was a total success. 
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could easily become to the unwary analyst a red herring. One must be aware of the 
distinction between Islam and contemporary Muslim societies, in order not to be fooled 
with the Western elements prevailing in those societies. 
Turning to the theory of distribution, one may ask, what is in Islamic teachings that 
would assist in building a macro theory in this field? Some of the elements that should 
be considered are reviewed in the following sections. 
B. Factors Afkcting Distribution 
There are certain non-economic factors which should be found in an Islamic society 
which would influence distribution. 
a. Differences in human-capital endowments. 
b. Differences in non-human capital inheritance. 
C. Technological relationships. 
d. Financial relationships. 
e. Social relations, within families, kith and kin. 
The first two variables are not unique to the Islamic model, for they play a role in 
other societies. The Islamic model, nonetheless, contains financial relationships which 
are unique in two ways: efficiency as well as redistributive implications. The efficiency 
aspect relates to whether an Islamic economy is capable of reaching and maintaining 
full employment. The answer to this question has not been put together yet, but traces of 
it can be found in some writings (e.g. Al-Jarhi, 1981). 
Briefly, social relationships combine the prohibition of interest on money, with the 
payment of z.akah on wealth inclusive of idle balances. The two added together implies 
a negative rate of return on hoardings. Banks in the Islamic model act as direct investors 
by supplying capital on a profit-loss-sharing basis, in addition to providing banking 
services. 
AB hoarding has been made irrational, financial resources are either held for 
transaction purposes, or used for consumption or investment. The interplay between the 
rate of time preference and the rate of return on investment produces an allocation of 
financial resources. AB long as there is no technological problem (e.g. shortages of 
investment opportunities) as long as the economy is below full employment the rate of 
return on investment is larger than zero. If the rate of time preference is kept reasonably 
low, full employment is attainable. 
An effective redistribution of income on a yearly basis to keep the poor propertied 
can lower the rate of time preference which could further facilitate the attainment of full 
employment. We will therefore assume a reasonable degree of factor substitutability as 
well as an effective redistributive policy. 
A question would arise about socioeconomic classes, whether it would be legitimate 
to speak about distribution to capitalists, laborers, and landowners. The answer to this 
question lies in the fourth variable, the financial relationships (Al-Jar hi, 1981 ). 
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In an Islamic economy, each Muslim channels his savings to investment either 
directly through buying stocks, or indirectly through (Islamic) banks. The Muslim 
would then be in a position similar to holding a common stock in an investment bank or 
in a particular company. Meanwhile, he could be working for a wage or a salary. 
Therefore, distinction between propertied and non-propertied individuals becomes more 
tenuous in such an economy. It becomes even more so because the poor whose property 
is below a certain limit, called nisab, are to be given more property through zakah. 
We can therefore say that Muslims in an Islamic society would mostly be capital 
holders, and most of them are salary- and wage-earners at the same time'1'l. The 
division of social classes would therefore become theoretically meaningless and 
practically dubious. 
Distribution within this framework can be studied on a functional basis, i.e., in 
terms of factor shares. It can also be studied on a personal basis, i.e., the relative shares 
of the poor, with property (temporarily) below nisab and the rich, those above it. 
Since nisab is not set with reference to a subsistence level, the owner of this 
minimum level of property should be well to do sufficiently to save and invest. Personal 
wealth is readjusted yearly to make sure that those who are below nisab must rise above 
it. Therefore, it should be interesting within an Islamic economy to look at the profit, as 
well as the wage-shares of those who become temporarily below nisab and those who 
stay above it 
Another question can be asked about the role of market forces in distribution within 
an Islamic economy. In this regard, the market-order of the Islamic financial system 
must be remembered (Al-Jarhi, 1981). Its functions would disallow monopoly and 
collusive behavior. Kalecki's degree of monopoly would not be significant in this regard 
as a factor influencing distributionC1•J. 
C. Redistribution 
The Islamic economic system is based on the premise that the prevailing 
distribution of wealth could deviate from that which is most desirable, i.e., where each 
Muslim capable of earning a living would be an owner of a minimum level of real 
wealth. It is not therefore surprising that several means of distribution have been built-in 
into the Islamic economy to insure the attainment of that level of wealth (Appendix III). 
This type of redistribution significantly modifies people's behavior towards saving, 
making it theoretically difficult to study redistribution separately. 
Some of these means are briefly reviewed below in order to demonstrate that 
distribution in ao Islamic economy cannot be separated from redistribution. Western 
models discuss the two questions separately. A macro model of distribution is built first, 
18. Some Muslims would become temporarily non-propertied for short periods before the yearly redistribution of 
mhh; which is given to the needy who can earn a living in terms of assets to enable them to be sufficierrtly 
productive for self-1Ustenance, and to those incapable, in terms of an income maintenance scheme. 
19. This would not remove the monopoly elements related to having special talents or owning a specific Site, 
although the market order division would attenuate the effects of such monopolies on prices. 
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then redistributive measures are introduced. Moreover, Western thinking places macro 
distribution models in positive economics, while it places redistribution into welfare 
economics. 
The luxury of such separation cannot be afforded to Islamic thinkers, for 
redistributive measures are integral parts of the Islamic economy without which positive 
analysis cannot be considered. One is tempted to hazard that even if separation is 
attempted, it cannot work. An example is the paper of Ahmad (1982), in which the only 
hasic characteristic of an Islamic economy the author found appropriate to introduce to 
the Kaldor-Pasinetti model, viz, Zikah, is redistributive. 
In addition to :zakah as an Islamic means of redistribution, we find the system of 
inheritance which forces the wealth of an individual to be redistributed after his death 
among a group of SPecific heirs in a prescribed manner. Islamic law allows no one to 
tamper with the post mortem redistribution of his wealth, except within a maximum of 
on1>- third ofhis wealth. 
For that on1>-third, each Muslim is called upon to will it out to the needy (within his 
relatives and then without) who would not otherwise be entitled to a share of his 
estateC20>. 
Another means of redistribution is through public goods, where the relatively poor 
can be fuvored with certain government services, e.g., education, health, housing, debt 
repayment, paying for the freedom of slaves, helping the wayfarer, assisting with 
marriage costs, and so forth. 
Another means of redistribution is carried out informally in an Islamic economy 
through the requirements of brotherhood that should exist among Muslims. Examples 
include the rights of neighbors, relations and guests, the dislike of a Muslim to keep 
extras of consumers goods (clothes, food, etc.) to himself while others are in need; and 
soon. 
It must be stressed in this respect that redistribution is not carried within Political 
borders, for it must be carried among the Islamic Ummah as a whole. Such is a concern 
for inter-country wealth diSParity that is rare to find in other systems. 
D. A Proposed Islamic Model 
1. Frameoork 
The hasic requirements for an Islamic model enumerated above demand a lot of 
effort, perhaps at stages, in order to arrive at an Islamic model for distribution. 
Nonetheless, the latest attempt to do so (Ahmad, 1982) has been a positive step in that 
direction which would call for another attempt, to construct a model which would be 
closer to Islam than to post-Keynesianism. 
20. Many scholars opine that such will is obligatory. 
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First, let us define income as 
y (PR+ WR +aZ) + (PN+ WN-Z) + (1- a) z (23) 
Where P and W refer to profits and wages, and subscripts R and N refer to 
recipients and non-recipients of 2JJkah, Z, respectively. The ratio a represents the 
proportion of zakah given to the poor. The last term of the identity represents the part of 
zakah allocated to other uses<2'l. 
It must be remembered that in an Islamic economy the investment centered banking 
processes, (Al-Jarhi, 1981) insure that savings are automatically channeled into 
investment. Moreover, since 21Jkah is levied on all financial and real assets, monetary 
hoardings will earn a negative rate of retorn equal to zakah rate. This implies that to 
hoard in an Islamic economy is irrational. 
The automatic transfer of savings into investment and the non existence of boarding 
assure that savings are equal to full-employment investment. Defining the average 
propensity to save out of 2Bkah allocated to other uses as 80 we obtain(22J 
I=S,.(P. + w. +aZ)+S,.(P. + w. -Z)+S0 (1-a)Z (24) 
Where I and S are full-employment levels of investment and savings, respectively. 
Propensities to save by recipients and non-recipients of 2JJkah, SR and ~ 
respectively have been used in (24) in addition to the propensity to save from 2Bkah 
allocated to other uses. The distinction between these two groups by the level of wealth 
lies in contrast with the division of society into social classes oflaborers and capitalists 
made by Kaldor-Pasinetti following the classics. It is also notable that Ahmad (1982) 
attempted a distinction similar to that of (24), but did not carry it through. Instead, he 
retorned to the classical social classes. 
2. Income Sb.ares 
The application of zakah deserves some observations. Th.ere is a general agreement 
in the literature that zakah is to be levied on wages and salaries above nisab. As to 
productive assets, amwaJ namiah, opinions vary as to whether 2Bkah should be levied 
on its total value or its net (after depreciation allowances) retorns; with the second 
opinion taking precedence. Considering that wages and profits accrued to non-
recipients contain the net retorns of productive assets above nisab, we can define ZJkah 
collected as: 
(25) 
Where z is the average rate of ZJkah, (corresponding to Ahmad's B) which is an 
average of actual rates weighted by their respective bases. We can therefore derive the 
21. See Appendix II. 
22. I am indebted for the addition of this term to Dr. Syed Taber of the Islamic University, Islamabad 
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In contrast to the Kaldor-Pasinetti approach, fulfilling the requirement that income 
shares lie between zero and unity depends upon: 
a - both of the saving propensities, and not the saving propensity of just one group, 
b - the average :zakah rate, 
c - the proportion of :zakah allocated to the poor, and 
d - the propensity to save out of :zakah allocated to other uses. 
Since equations (26) and (27) show the pre-redistribution shares, it is remarkable 
that those shares should depend on the rules ofredistribution, i.e., a and z. This proves 
our earlier postulate that in an Islamic economy the study of redistribution cannot be 
separated from distribution. 
3. Factor Shares 
Factor shares can be derived from the model after defining the average rates of 
:zakah on wages and profits as Zw and Z, respectively and the propeusities to save out of 
wages and profits, Sw and Sp respectively, as the weighted averages of the saving 
propensities of recipients and non-recipients in each categoryofincome(24l. 
W = liY-SP+(l-a)(S,-S0 )Z/Y 
Y (S.,-S,)Q+aZw-ZW) (28) 
P l!Y-Sw +(l-a)(Sw-S0 )Z/Y 
Y (S, -Sw)(l+aZp-ZP) (29) 
Another contrast to the Kaldor-Pasinetti results is clear from (28) and (29). Factor 
shares do not depend on the propensities to save from a particular kind of income 
(wages or profits) alone, as in equation (16) above. Each factor share in (28) and (29) 
depends on both propensities to save as well as the rate of :zakah and the rate of 
redistribution. 
When steady state growth rates are derived, the profit rates on capital owned by 
recipients KR and non-recipients KN are equal to<2'l. 
23. See Appendix II. 
24. Detailed derivation is presented in Appendix II. 
25. Equatioos (42) and (45), Appendix II. 
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_!'.._= g w. +aZ 
K. s. K. 
PN g -=-~-
KN SN(l-Z) KN 
(30) 
(31) 
Similarly, equations (30) and (31) drastically differ from (18) in the Kaldor-
Pasinetti model and (21) in Ahmad's model, especially in the fact that the rate of profit 
depends, in addition to the saving propensity of either group, on the rates of :zakah and 
redistribution. 
4. Comparison with the ""8tern Model 
We can now compare the results obtained above with those of the Western model as 
elaborated by Kaldor (1961) and Pasinetti (1962) in three ways, income disparity, rate 
of return on capital and growth. 
It is obvious that zalath receipts will raise the incomes of recipients in two ways: 
One in terms of an income maintenance scheme, and the other in terms of productive 
assets enabling recipients to independently sustain a living during life time. In either 
case, the income differential between recipients and non-recipients is narrowed. 
Consequently a degree of distributive equity is maintained. 





Wbere n is the rate of growth and Sc is the savings propensity of the capitalist class. 
The rate of return on capital in the proposed Islamic model is represented by equations 
(30) and (31 ). Assuming that Sc = S. and g = n, the rate ofreturn on capital in the 
Islamic model is greater than that in the Kaldor-Pasinetti model when 
(33) 
The right-hand side is the ratio of wage income to capital holdings of non-
recipients. Obviously, it is a small percentage, for ifthe ratio of total earnings to capital 
were 10% (a reasonable figure under stable prices), the wage income/capital ratio could 
not exceed 5%, implying a rate of return on capital amounting to 5%. It would be more 
reasonable to assume a lower wage income/capital ratio, however, for non- recipients 
depend relatively less on that source of income. 
On the left-hand side, the rate of growth g is greater than one, while the saving ratio 
is less than one, causing their quotient to be a multiple of one. Assuming negligible 
growth of 1 %, and a saving ratio of 10%, we get a quotient of 10. Assuming zakah rate 
to be 0.025, the left-hand side will be equal to about 26% which is higher than a wage 
income/capital ratio of 5%. 
Tomirds an I.slamic Macro Model ofDiatribution: A Comparative Approach 21 
It must be noted that the left-hand side would assume even greater values with 
higher real growth and higher saving ratios. We must therefure conclude that, under 
normal conditions, the rate of return on capital in an Islamic economy should exceed the 
corresponding rate in a western-type economy characterized by Kaldor-Pasinetti 
properties. This is so, remembering our assumption of Sc ~ ~ and g ~ n. However, if 
g > n, as will be shown below, the rate of return on capital would even be higher in an 
Islamic economy. The case where Sc * ~ requires further investigation. 
In order to judge which economy has higher growth, we can derive from (30) and 
(31) the following two conditions under which the rate of growth in an Islamic economy 
should be higher. 
SR~+ w. +aZ>~.S 
K K K c 
R 
(34) 
s (1-Z)(~+ w")>~.s 
N K K K c 
N 
(35) 
It is obvious that the first condition as expressed by (34), is true. In equation (35), it 
becomes obvious that the second condition is fulfilled when it is noticed that: 
(36) 
We therefore conclude that an Islamic economy so outlined would have higher 
growth, higher return on capital, and more equitable distribution of wealth. 
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APPENDIX 11 
(1) 
but Ye = Pc ( 1 - 8 ( ~:) ) , (Ahmad: 13) (2) 
pc ( 1 - 8 ( Ac ) ) = _!!_ ( 3) 
Kc pc Sc 
A feasible solution requires 
pc (1 - 0 ( Ac) ) 




:: > 0.025 (8) 
1. See Hacche (1979: 222)(12. 15). 
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A. Basic Relations 
B. Income Shares 
APPENDIX II 








Y is full employment income such that S = I (9) 
Substituting in (1) from (2), (3) and (4) we get: 
Y = ( (WR + PR) + az (W N + PN) ) + 
( (WN + PN) (I - z) + (I - a) z (WN + PN) ) (10) 
YR = Y - (WN + PN) [ (I - z) + (I - az) l (11) 
Substituting for YR in (1) from (2) we get: 
Y = (WR + PR) + aZ) + (WN + PN) (I - z) + (I - a) Z (12) 
YN = Y-(WR + PR)-Z (13) 
s = SR y R + SN y N +So (I - a) z ( 14) 
Substituting from (11), (3) and (4), 
= SR y - SR (WN + PN) (I - az) + SN (I - z) 
(WN + PN) + s0 (I - a) Z (15) 
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= sR Y + (WN + PN) (sN (I - z) - sR (I - az) 
+ s0 (l - a)z (WN + PN) 
Similarly, by using (2) and (13), 
I = S = sR (WR + PR) + asRZ + sN Y - sN (WR + PR) 
+s0 (l - a)Z 
Substituting for Z from (4) , and using (1) , we get: 
WR + PR I!Y - ( sN - s0 z (l - a) ) 
y SN - SR - S0 Z (I - a) 
From (18), 
w p 
0 < N .=+- N < I if y ' 
a. (sN - sR) > z (sN - asR) + s0 z (I - a), 
b. (I!Y) > sR , and 
c. (I!Y) < sN - z (sN - asR) + S0 z (l - a). 
From (21) 
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b. f/Y > (sN - s0 z (I - a)) , and (23-b) 
c. IN < 2sN - SR - 2 s0 (1 - a) (23-c) 
C. Factor Shares 
(24) 
(25) 
Defining zw and zP as zakah rate on wages and profits, respectively , 
zWN zPN 
z = - . z = - (26) 
w w ' p p 
Rewriting (10) 
Y W + P + azw W + azPP - Zw W - zPP + (I - a) Z (28) 
(I + azw - Zw) W + (I + azp - zp) P + (I - a) Z (29) 
le t Wand~ be disposable (after redistribution) wages and profits , then: 
Define the saving propensities out of disposable wages and profit as 
sRWR + sNWN sRPR + sNPN 
sw = W ; sp = p (31) 
Theo 
l = S = Sw (I + azw - Zw) W + SP (I + azp - zp) P + S0 (I - a) Z (32) 
(32) can be solved for Win terms of Y using (29): 
I= Sw_(I + azw-Zw) w +Sp 
(Y - (I + azw - Zw) W - (1- a) Z) + S0 (I- a) Z 
w 
y 
l!Y - sp + (I - a) (SP - s0 ) Z/Y 
(sw - sp) (I + azw - Zw) 
(33) 
(35) 
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Similarly , (32) can be solved for Pin terms of Y using (29) 
I = SP (I + azr - zp) P + Sw (Y - (I + azr - zp) P - (I - a) Z ) + s0 (I - a) Z 
(36) 




lJY - Sw + (I - a) ( sw - sJ Z/Y 
(sr - sw) (I + azr - zp) 
D. Steady State Growth 
(38) 
Define capital assets with recipients and non-recipients as KR and KN, 
respective! y. 
The relative rates of growth in both types of capital must, in steady 
state, be equal to the rate of balanced growth g , so that: 
~: = ~: = g, and (39) 
g 
Substituting for SH in (39) 
sR(WR +PR+ aZ) 
KR 
g 
P (WR+ aZ) 
SK K: + SK KR = g 
Similarly, substituting for sN in ( 40), 
sN ( (I - z) WN + (I - z) PN) 
KN 
PN WN 
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Appendix ill 
The Salient Features of :zakah • 
Zakah is one of the pillars of Islam. Denying it by a Muslim is tantamount to 
apostasy which is equivalent to treason in an Islamic State. 
It can be likened to what is known in modern terms as a redistributive wealth tax to 
which all assets, amool, beyond a certain limit are subjected regardless of the age or 
status of their owners. It is a religious obligation on each Muslim. Nonetheless, the 
Islamic State can levy a similar tax on its non-Muslim subjects, to be used for the same 
purposes. The assets on which zakah is payable must fulfill the following conditions: 
1 - Growth, except for monetary balances. 
2 - Quantity owned exceeds a certain minimum level called nisab. 
3 - Quantity owned exceeds the necessary amount of assets whose income supplies 
the basic needs, hajat asliah, of their owners. Basic needs include: food, cloth, shelter, 
defense weapons, repayment of debt, tools of work, home furniture, and transportation 
of owner, his wire, children and those for whom he is financially responsible. 
4 - If the asset is either cattle or money, its ownership by the individual must 
continue uninterrupted for one year before zakah becomes due. 
Kinds of Zakatable Assets: 
1 - Animal wealth, except working animals. 
2 - Gold, silver, and monies. 
3 - Jewellery, beyond reasonable requirements. 
4 - Commodities (including assets) in the hands of merchants for the purpose of 
exchange (working capital). 
5 - Crops and fruit. 
6 - Rented land. •• 
7 - Honey and animal products. 
8 - Mineral resources. 
9 - Marine products like fish, pearls, ambergris, minerals extracted from the sea, 
etc. 
10 - Buildings and factories. •• 
11 - Wages and salaries (as they are received). •• 
12 - Stocks and other financial assets. 
* Based on Yusuf Al--Qaradawi, Fiqh Al-Zakah, Al-Risa.lab est., Beirut, 3rd ed., 1397H, 1977g. 
**According to the common practice based on the opinion of the majority of jurists the income from rented land, 
building and filctories is subject to Zakatat an annual rate of2.5% and wages and salaries are Zakatable not as 
they are received but, along with other wealth, at the end of the year. The writer has adopted the opinion of 
al-Qardawi who considers wages and salaries to be Zakatable as 1hey are received and subjects the yield of 
rented land, buildings and factories, net of depreciation, to a rate of 10% (analogous to agricultural crops). 
[Editor] 
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The Uses of ZakBh Revenue 
Al- Quran mentions eight uses.' 
I - the poor 
2 -the needy 
3 - ZJkah collectors 
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4 - "those whose hearts are to be reconciled" 
5 - to free captives 
6 - insolvent debtors 
7 - the cause of Allah 
8 - the wayfarer 
Obviously, putting the poor and the needy on the top of the list allots them the 
highest priority. This reflects the ostensibly distributive nature of ZJkah. 
How Much to be Given 
The poor and the needy can be both divided into two categories: those capable of 
earning a living, and those who are not. 
The first group are to be given assets which would be sufficient and suitable to 
enable each to sustain his living, e.g., tools of the profession, capital for an enterprise, 
land to fium, etc. Members of this group would be made propertied in a way that 
disqualifies them from obtaining a share in ZJkah in the future. 
The second group would get an income maintenance to sustain themselves 
periodically, e.g., monthly or weekly. 
This method of redistribution enables the first group to cross the subsistence line 
into property ownership. Thus, they find themselves interested in saving to maintain 
their wealth on the one hand, and to accumulate on the other hand. Their saving 
propensity would not be expected to be smaller than that of their wealthier counterpart. 
"' Al-Taubab, IX. 60. 
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